Rassie Erasmus got too clever in his mind games and got beaten

Rassie Erasmus has earned the right to be called a rugby genius, but he is not immune from criticism when his genius becomes an exercise in unnecessary cleverness. Paris on Friday night was one of those occasions.

The most applicable saying is in Afrikaans: ‘Slim van sy baas’.

The Springboks lost 21-19 to France in a Test they should have won, against a French team they should have beaten comfortably, and with a match 23 that should never have left the Stade de France wondering how it had all gone so horribly wrong.

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Erasmus got it wrong.

He has got so much right in the past eight years. This is the man who has been the architect of South African rugby’s greatest period of international success. Two successive World Cups, the British & Irish Lions series, Rugby Championship titles and a Springbok team that has redefined the standards of physicality, squad depth and winning.

But none of that excuses Paris.

And none of that should be used to diminish the disappointment of a Friday night in which Erasmus’s Springboks managed to turn a Test they were expected to win into one they somehow found a way to lose.

There will be those who insist the result means nothing if the Boks win a third successive World Cup in Australia next year.

Of course, the 2027 World Cup is the ultimate prize. Of course, Erasmus will be judged most emphatically on whether his Springboks become the first nation to win three successive World Cups.

But why should that make losing to France in November 2026 acceptable?

Why should two hours of a South African supporter’s Friday night be dismissed as an experiment in the greater good of something that may or may not happen in 12 months?

Supporters invest emotionally in every Test. They don’t get to rewind their Friday night when a coach explains that the bigger picture is more important than the scoreboard.

And when the Springboks are as good as this team, winning now and winning next year should never be presented as mutually exclusive ambitions.

The madness of Paris started an hour before kick-off.

Erasmus had announced his starting XV. He had selected a front row capable of physically overwhelming France, and he had the most imposing starting pack in world rugby available to him.

Then he changed the front row.

An hour before kick-off, the second-choice front row was promoted to start, and the very foundation on which the Boks should have built their victory was compromised by their own coach.

This was self-inflicted.

The French were missing too many established internationals for the Springboks to be approaching this Test with anything other than the intention of imposing their strongest possible combination from the opening whistle.

The occasion demanded the best starting pack. It demanded brutality in the scrum, dominance at the collision and an opening hour that would have taken the contest away from the hosts.

Instead, Erasmus decided to be clever.

And this time, clever wasn’t good enough.

The Bomb Squad has been one of Erasmus’s greatest innovations. The ability to introduce world-class forwards in the final 20 or 30 minutes has changed the way Test rugby is played. Opponents have been battered into submission by Springbok replacements who would start for almost every other international team.

But the Bomb Squad is not a substitute for getting the starting selection right.

In Paris, the Springboks needed their best forwards to establish control, not to arrive later and attempt to rescue a contest that should already have been dictated by South Africa.

The irony is that the Boks, so often the masters of winning matches in the final quarter, couldn’t find a way to win this one.

And there is no consolation in a two-point margin.

A defeat by two points is still a defeat, and when the opposition is as depleted as France were, the narrowness of the scoreline should make the result more frustrating, not less.

The 42-38 defeat against Australia in Perth could be explained away because Erasmus had selected what was largely a second-string Springbok team.

There was some justification for the experimentation, even if there was no justification for losing.

Paris offered no such defence.

This was an established Springbok match 23, packed with World Cup winners, proven internationals and players who have made South Africa the benchmark of world rugby.

And still they lost.

They trailed 21-7, needed to fight their way back and, even with overwhelming scrum dominance, failed to turn their superiority into victory.

Ill-discipline and playing with 14 for 30 minutes added to the complexities of the defeat.

These defeats matter because it gives France, New Zealand and the like belief that the Springboks are beatable because teams are knocking them over on occasion, and it takes only one play-off defeat at next year’s World Cup and they are on their way home.

The Boks remain favourites for the World Cup, but the manner of the respective defeats, last year in New Zealand, Argentina and at Ellis Park against Australia, coupled with this year’s defeats to New Zealand at Ellis Park and France in Paris, have inspired the chasing pack.

How I called it wrong in my prediction, although the prediction was based on the starting front row selection actually starting.